SMU Law Review
Volume 5

Issue 1

Article 2

January 1951

Business Records - A Proposed Rule of Admissibility
Roy R. Ray

Recommended Citation
Roy R. Ray, Business Records - A Proposed Rule of Admissibility, 5 SW L.J. 33 (1951)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol5/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted
for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit
http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.

19511

BUSINESS RECORDS

BUSINESS RECORDS-A PROPOSED RULE
OF ADMISSIBILITY*
Roy R. Rayt

T

HE proof of business records is controlled in Texas, as in

most states, by common law principles which were developed
in a time when most business transactions were simple and the
number of persons who participated in any one transaction was
small. As a matter of fact the first rules peculiar to entries in
account books were those created to permit merchants to prove
their just claims when they were disqualified as witnesses because
they were parties. When a small shopkeeper sued for goods sold
and he alone had personal knowledge of the transaction, he could
not testify. This was manifestly so unjust that the courts permitted
him to put his account book in evidence and take an oath to the
correctness of the entries. This became known as the "Shopbook
Rule" and was recognized in Texas. Since it was clearly an evasion
of the rule of incompetency of parties, the courts felt it necessary
rigidly to restrict this kind of evidence. The usual requirements
for the admission of the party's account books were: that he had
no clerk, that the entry must not be one as to a cash transaction
(which could be evidenced by a note or receipt), that the party
had a good reputation for honest and correct dealing and that the
books bore an honest appearance. Some courts added the requirement that the entry must have been made reasonably near the
time of the delivery of the goods or rendition of the services
covered by the entries. It is at once apparent that under the most
*This paper has been deliberately prepared without any footnotes for several
reasons: (1) It is not intended for reference by an attorney preparing or trying a case.
(2) There is adequate authority for all statements made in the paper. (3) An attempt
has been made to put the material in a form in which it can be understood by business
men as well as lawyers. (4) It is believed that the paper can be read more easily if not
interrupted by constant reference to cases and other materials.
tA.B., LL.B., S.J.D. Professor of Law and Supervisor of Instruction, Southern
Methodist University, School of Law; author (with Charles T. McCormick) of TExAS
LAW OF EVIDENCE (1937).
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liberal view the "Shopbook Rule" is not suitable to modem business conditions. This is nowhere better demonstrated than in an
Oregon case where the supreme court of that state used 27 pages
in collecting the cases and comments which show the confusion
of the courts as to the scope of the rule and its relation to the
regular entry principle.
In England, sometime prior to 1700, the courts began to admit
in evidence entries made by a deceased clerk in the regular course
of his duties if they were made in books of persons not parties
to the suit. This rule was soon extended to include entries in a
party's books by a deceased clerk and later to cover all entries
made by a person since deceased in the regular course of his
duties whether the entrant was a party, a clerk of a party or wholly
unconnected with either of the parties to the suit. The broadening
of the rule as to regular entries eliminated the need for any special rule to cover a party's books, and since late in the 19th century England has had no separate shopbook exception to the hearsay rule.
In this country, although the "Shopbook Rule" had existed from
colonial days, no general rule for regular entries seems to have
been developed until the early 1800s. As business grew out of the
"one-man shop" stage, the need for a broader rule was recognized,
and once the "business entry" rule was established, it came to
assume far more practical importance than the "Shopbook Rule."
However, as distinguished from the English rule, the regular entry
rule, for the most part, was not applied to records of a party to
the suit, the admissibility of these still being determined by the
old "Shopbook Rule." Later statutes abolished the incompetency
of parties as witnesses in civil cases, and this would seem to have
done away completely with any necessity of preserving the "Shopbook Rule" or its restrictions. Fortunately, we had never codified
the rule in Texas, and although some references may be found to
it in the decisions, it is believed that the modem Texas cases
have abandoned the "Shopbook Rule" and apply only the general
rule as to regular entries in the course of business.

BUSINESS RECORDS

As in the "Shopbook Rule," the courts also required much
preliminary proof before records could be admitted under the
"regular entries" rule. The chief requirements were: the entry
must have been made in the regular course of business by a
person in the discharge of his duties or in the course of his employment, and by a person who had personal knowledge of the
facts recorded or to whom the information recorded had been
communicated by one who knew the facts and reported them in the
course of his employment. The entry must also have been made
within a short time after the transaction occurred. Another restriction was that the entries must be original entries as distinguished from transcribed records or copies. It is obvious that
if this requirement had been strictly enforced, proof of business
transactions would have been difficult indeed. In many businesses
the daily transactions are noted on slips, memoranda, etc. by the
employee concerned, and these are promptly collected and entries
made therefrom in a permanent book or ledger. It is now generally held that entries in the first permanent records comply with
the requirement of original entries. Furthermore, today the courts
seem to admit the first slips or memoranda made at the time of
the transaction. Another restriction found in the older cases was
that the entries must relate only to goods sold or services rendered.
This limitation was certainly inappropriate to the rule admitting
book entries, and, fortunately, our courts have extended the rule
to cover "any matter pertinent to the business in question" and
customarily recorded. In earlier days of the rule the courts
confined the operation of the rule to business records in the strict
sense, i.e., those of a commercial nature. Thus, until comparatively recent times many courts did not allow proof of records
of professional people such as doctors, lawyers, etc. nor records
of institutions such as hospitals, under the business entries rule.
Fortunately, the present day scope has been broadened to include
establishments and books of a non-commercial nature, such as
church and hospital records.
From this brief recital of some of the most important limita-
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tions placed by the courts on this rule, it must be obvious that
proof of business transactions became both a burdensome and
expensive process. This emphasis on form and refinements, with
little or no attention to the needs of modern business practice,
brought only ridicule and contempt from business men who
daily conducted their businesses on the basis of records which
the courts were too pedantic to receive in evidence. But the chief
problem is connection with the book entries is that of authentication. It is clear that the entries do not prove themselves and
should not be admitted in the absence of some preliminary showing as to what the books and entries are and under what circumstances they were kept. How may this showing be made? Where
the person who made the entries to be offered has personal knowledge of the facts recorded, is produced as a witness and testifies
to the correctness of the entries, they are admissible as records
of his past recollection. They may also be used to refresh his
present recollection if examination of the entry has that effect,
in which case they would not be introduced in evidence. The same
principles will apply where the witness called did not make the
entries but had personal knowledge of the correctness of the
entries and supervised the keeping of the books. In these cases
there is no real difficulty and no need to resort to any special rules
regarding book entries, since these principles apply to any
memoranda. But under modern business conditions the above
situations seldom exist because the various persons who participated in the transaction usually cannot all be produced as
witnesses.
The normal case is one where either the entrant or the one
upon whose knowledge the entry was based or both are unavailable as witnesses. It is here that we find the most serious objection to the common law business entry exception to the hearsay
rule. Assuming that all of the other requirements are met, the
common law rule (in force in Texas and most states) requires
that the person who made the entry and all persons upon whose
information it was based be produced as witnesses or shown to be
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unavailable by reason of death or other cause before the entry
can be admitted. This indicates a lack of understanding as to how
modem business operates. The average accounting system used by
business firms requires numerous entries in a series of records to
record a transaction from beginning to end. Many business entries
are made on loose leaf sheets or cards and are typewritten rather
than in longhand. They are made by various entrants upon information furnished from many sources. It is frequently impossible
to identify the person who made a particular entry or who reported the information upon which it was based. Even where this
is possible, the location and production of the entrant may prove
an insurmountable task. With the large employee turnover in the
average establishment and the moving away of former clerks it
will often be extremely difficult and sometimes impossible to
establish positively that a particular entrant is dead, out of the
jurisdiction or otherwise unavailable. But the real point overlooked too often by the courts is that even if all the persons who
had a part in the transaction could be produced as witnesses,
nothing would be accomplished if the entry is the usual routine
one. The maker of the final entry normally has no personal knowledge of the transaction recorded, and the persons who reported
the information and who did have personal knowledge will almost
inevitably have no recollection about the particular transaction.
Their testimony will invariably be merely a statement that they
correctly reported and/or recorded the matter in question.
The rigid requirements of the common law necessitating production of the entrant and reporter or proof that they are dead
or otherwise unavailable serve no useful purpose and actually
prevent or discourage the proof of just claims. They must be
eliminated as prerequisites of admissibility. After all, the mere
admission of such records as evidence does not mean that they
are to be accepted as conclusive. They are open to attack like
all other evidence. All that should be required for the admission
of an entry is testimony by any competent witness that it was
made in the regular course of business as a part of the record of
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some establishment and near enough to the time of the act recorded to have been fresh in the memory of those participating
in the transaction. All other matters, including non-production of
the entrants and reporters, should affect only the weight to be
given to the entry.
The call for reform in this field has been echoed time and
again by leading lawyers, judges, legal writers and businessmen.
In 1923, in the second edition of his monumental treatise, Wigmore
wrote:
[S]uch entries are dealt with in that way in the most im"1...
portant undertakings of mercantile and industrial life. They are the
ultimate basis of calculation, investment, and general confidence in
every business enterprise. Nor does the practical impossibility of
obtaining constantly and permanently the verification of every employee affect the trust that is given to such books. It would seem that
expedients which the entire commercial world recognizes as safe

could be sanctioned, and not discredited, by courts of justice. When
it is a mere question of whether provisional confidence can be placed
in a certain class of statements, there cannot profitably and sensibly

be one rule for the business world and another for the court-room.
The merchant and the manufacturer must not be turned away remediless because methods in which the entire community places a just

confidence are a little difficult to reconcile with technical judicial
scruples on the part of the same persons who as attorneys have
already employed and relied upon the same methods. In short, courts
must here cease to be pedantic and endeavor to be practical."

Only a few courts have accepted Mr. Wigmore's theory and
frankly recognized that the courts have lagged far behind business practice in the credence attached to business records. Decisions from Kentucky, Georgia, North Carolina, Michigan, Minnesota, Washington and New Hampshire have adopted a liberal
enough construction of the business entry rule to receive records
in evidence where the inconvenience of producing the witnesses
or accounting for their non-production clearly outweighed any
advantage to be gained from insisting on the technical requirements of the rule. And in an excellent decision in 1922 the Texas
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Commission of Appeals admitted in evidence the ledger sheets of
a bank upon the testimony of the president who identified them
as a part of the bank's permanent records and affirmed the general
correctness of such records. The court did not require testimony
from the bookkeeper who made the entries, saying,
"At most, he could only testify that the entries made by him are true
entries of transactions reported to him by others. Inother words, he
could only testify that he wrote down what others told him."
While this is sound as far as it goes, it does not go far enough.
Reform in this field has been exceedingly slow, and it has long
been recognized by authorities that sporadic judicial decisions
liberalizing the rule here and there are not the answer. Needed
improvement will come only through the legislature or through
the rule-making power of the courts. Fortunately, there have been
several outstanding movements for reform. The first one on a
broad scale was the work of the special committee of the Commonwealth Fund named to study and report on needed reforms
in the law of evidence. One of the matters it considered was
business entries. This committee included such eminent lawyers
and scholars as Professors Morgan and Sunderland, the late Professors Wigmore and Hinton and the late Judge Hough. After
more than five years of research, a study of over eighteen hundred decisions and replies to a questionnaire sent to a large number of business firms, the committee's report was published in
1927. It recommended the adoption of several statutes. The text
of the one on business entries is as follows:
"Any writing or record, whether in the form of an entry in a book
or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence or event shall be admissible in evidence in proof of
said act, transaction, occurrence or event, if the trial judge shall find
that it was made in the regular course of any business, and that it
was the regular course of such business to make such memorandum or
record at the time of such act, transaction, occurrence or event or within
a reasonable time thereafter. All other circumstances of the making
of such writing or record, including lack of personal knowledge by
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the entrant or maker, may be shown to affect its weight, but they shall
not affect its admissibility. The term 'business' shall include business,
profession, occupation and calling of every kind."

This statute was adopted verbatim in New York in 1928 and
served as the model for the statute adopted by Congress in 1936
for the federal courts. It has also been adopted in modified form
in several other states including Connecticut, Maryland, Michigan,
Rhode Island and Maine. Oregon adopted it but later changed to
the Uniform Act. Massachusetts amended its statute to bring it
into agreement with the model statute of the Commonwealth Fund
committee.
In 1936 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, after several years of study, approved and promulgated an act designed to achieve the same ends. It was entitled
"Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act" and its text is as
follows:
"Definition. The term 'business' shall include every kind of business, profession, occupation, calling or operation of institutions,
whether carried on for profit or not.
"Business Records. A record of an act, condition or event, shall,
in so far as relevant, be competent evidence if the custodian or other
qualified witness testifies to its identity and the mode of its preparation, and if it was made in the regular course of business, at or near
the time of the act, condition or event, and if, in the opinion of the
court, the sources of information, method and time of preparation
were such as to justify its admission."
It will be seen that this act is quite similar to the Common.
wealth Fund Statute. It appears that the Commissioners used it
as a model and intended to make no real significant change. In
their prefatory note they say, "The Conference in the present act
has attempted to devise a standard wording, which will serve to
uniformize its provisions as it is adopted from time to time in
other states." Aside from the change and reduction in verbiage
th,- nnly significant differences between the two acts are: (1) The
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inclusion of the term "condition" in the Uniform Act. (2) A
requirement in the Uniform Act that the record must be testified
to on the stand by some appropriate person. (3) In the Commonwealth Statute after the trial judge finds that the record was made
"in the regular course of any business" and that it was the regular course of the business to make such a memorandum or record,
all other circumstances such as lack of personal knowledge by
the entrant of the facts affect only the weight. In the Uniform Act
there is no such limit on the judge's discretion. Even after the
foundation is laid, the judge does not have to admit the entry unless
"in the opinion of the court, the sources of information, method and
time of preparationwere such as to justify its admission." (Italics
added.)
The Uniform Act has now been adopted in some sixteen states
including: California, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon (it replaced the
Commonwealth Fund Statute), Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington and Wyoming.
In 1942 the American Law Institute approved and published
its Model Code of Evidence. Its reporter was Professor Edmund
M. Morgan, who was chairman of the Commonwealth Fund committee. Its business-entry rule was admittedly based on the Commonwealth Statute. The text is as follows:
"BUSINESS ENTRIES AND THE LIKE.
"(1) A writing offered as a memorandum or record of an act,
event or condition is admissible as tending to prove the occurrence
of the act or event or the existence of the condition if the judge finds
that it was made in the regular course of a business and that it was
the regular course of that business for one with personal knowledge
of such act, event or condition to make such a memorandum or record or to transmit information thereof to be included in such a
memorandum or record, and for the memorandum or record to be
made at or about the time of the act, event or condition or within a
reasonable time thereafter.
"(2) Evidence of the absence of a memorandum or record of an
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asserted act, event or condition from the memoranda or records of a

business is admissible as tending to prove the non-occurrence of the
act or event or the non-existence of the condition in that business,
if the judge finds that it was the regular course of that business to
make such memoranda of all such acts, events, or conditions at the
time thereof or within a reasonable time thereafter, and to preserve

them.
"(3) The word 'business' as used in Paragraphs (1) and (2)
includes every kind of occupation and regular organized activity,
whether conducted for profit or not."
The rule differs from the Commonwealth Statute in four
respects: (1) It applies to conditions as well as to acts and events.
(2) It includes every kind 'of institution, making clear that conduct for profit is not essential. (3) It provides that the person
having knowledge of the act, event or condition, either must make
the entry or in the course of business transmit the information to
be included in the entry. (4) The rule makes evidence of absence
of a memorandum receivable to show the non-occurrence of any
act or event or the non-existence of a condition. These two latter
features are not in the Uniform Act.
One further significant effort for reform in this field is worthy
of attention. In 1945 the Integrated Bar of Missouri created an
Evidence Code Committee charged with the task of formulating a
Code of Evidence for that state. After several years of research
and study this committee, composed of representatives from the
various courts, professors from the law schools in Missouri, and
practicing attorneys, published in 1948 a printed pamphlet of the
Proposed Missouri Evidence Code. This code was amended after
suggestions were received from the bar and has now been approved by a large majority of the lawyers of Missouri. It will be
submitted to the state legislature in January, 1951. The code
contains a section on business entries modeled after the several
acts mentioned above but is not quite as liberal in some respects
as those acts. I quote from a comment on this section by Charles
L. Carr, Chairman of the Code Committee:
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"This section recognizes that business entries today are made by
numerous and varying clerks knowing little or nothing about the
items recorded, that other (and often numerous) employes or former
employes have a composite knowledge of the transaction recorded
and that the evidence rules relating to the authentication of business
entries and their admissibility in evidence have to be modified
accordingly."
This is the general picture. Now what of the situation in Texas?

Attention was called to the need for liberalization of this rule in
1937 in the treatise, Texas Law of Evidence, and the desirable
change was pointed out. But so far as I know, no serious effort
at remedial legislation has been made by the bar or any segment
of it. However, I believe this to be due chiefly to the laissez faire
attitude of the profession generally where improvement in procedure is concerned. There would appear to be no reason why our
legislature should not adopt a sensible, modern rule on this subject, but it will not be likely to take any action unless a large
percent of the profession actively advocates it. It seems to me

that a much more feasible way to bring about this much needed
liberalization in the admissibility of business records in Texas is
through the promulgation by our supreme court of a rule to be
followed by all the courts of this state. That the Texas Supreme
Court has the necessary authority under its rule-making power
cannot be seriously questioned. In connection with the Rules of
Civil Procedure it has already adopted a highly desirable rule
of evidence concerning Judicial Notice of Laws of Other States

(Rule 184a). The source of this rule was the American Law
Institute's Code of Evidence, Rules 801-806. In my judgment a
liberal rule as to business entries is just as important and the
need is equally great. I cannot conceive of any substantial opposition from the Bar to such a rule, and I think it would be a step
in the direction of convincing the lay public that the courts are
more interested in dispensing justice than in holding on to technical rules which have no sound basis in reason.
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I propose the adoption by the Supreme Court of Texas of the
following rule:
ADMISSIBILITY OF BUSINESS RECORDS
(A) A memorandum or record of an act, event or condition shall,
in so far as relevant, be competent evidence of the occurrence
of the act or event or the existence of the condition if the judge
finds that:
(1) It was made in the regular course of business
(2) It was the regular course of that business for an employee
or representative of such business with personal knowledge
of such act, event or condition to make such memorandum
or record or to transmit information thereof to be included
in such memorandum or record
(3) It was made at or near the time of the act, event or condition or reasonably soon thereafter.
(B) The identity and mode of preparation of the memorandum or
record in accordance with the provisions of paragraph (A) may
be proved by the testimony of the entrant, custodian or other
qualified witness even though he may not have personal knowledge as to the various items or contents of such memorandum
or record. Such lack of personal knowledge may be shown to
affect the weight and credibility of the memorandum or record
but shall not affect its admissibility.
(C) Evidence to the effect that the records of a business do not contain any memorandum or record of an alleged act, event or
condition shall be competent to prove the non-occurrence of the
act, or event or the non-existence of the condition in that business if the judge finds that:
It was the regular course of that business to make such
memoranda or records of all such acts, events or conditions
at the time or within reasonable time thereafter and to preserve them.
(D) "Business" as used in this rule includes any and every kind of
regular organized activity whether conducted for profit or not.
This proposed court rule is based in part on the several model
statutes discussed above. I have attempted to incorporate the best

features of the several proposals and to make the provisions as
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definite as possible. For example, in paragraph (A) I have made
it clear that the rule includes a memorandum as well as a record
in a book. The term "condition," which did not appear in the
Commonwealth Fund Statute but is in the Uniform Act, is included. This is especially important in connection with hospital
records of a patient's condition. Siib-paragraph A(2) follows the
Commonwealth Fund Statute but goes further and requires that
the person having personal knowledge of the act, event or condition must either make the memorandum or record or in the
regular course of business transmit the information to be included
in the memorandum or record. Paragraph (A) requires specific
findings by the trial judge as a condition precedent to the admissibility of the records instead of giving him broad discretion as
to the "sources of information, method and time of preparation."
Paragraph (B) permits proof of the identity and mode of preparation of the record by any qualified witness without the requirement of personal knowledge of the matters recorded. This is based
both upon the Uniform Act and the American Law Institute Rule.
Paragraph (C) extends the rule beyond either the Commonwealth
Statute or the Uniform Act in providing that the absence of an
entry may be used to prove the non-occurrence of the act or event
or the non-existence of the condition. Here again specific findings
by the trial judge are mandatory before such evidence is admissible. This is in accord with the American Law Institute Rule. It
is believed that this is an important part of the rule and within the
spirit of the general principle. Finally, as in all of the model acts,
paragraph (D) makes it clear that the rule is not limited to commercial businesses. Instead of using the phrase "business, profession, occupation or calling" I have used the broad term "regular organized activity whether conducted for profit or not."

